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ComprehensiveControl and
Partial Liberalization: The 1950s
Inthe main, this chapter contains a detailed description of the machinery and
attributes of the comprehensive restrictive system of Phase I, the years
1949—51. It also includes an explanation of how the radical policy changes
introduced during 1952—54 (Phase III), as well as the milder and more
gradual changes of 1955—61 (first stage of Phase IV) have altered the nature
of the system.
i. ORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM OF
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS'
The legal and institutional framework for quantitative restrictions on foreign
trade was inherited by the government of Israel in 1948 from the mandatory
government of Palestine. Administrative regulation of trade was first intro-
duced in 1939 when World War II broke out. The Ordinance of Imports,
Exports, and Customs, by which the regulation was imposed, was originally
meant to prevent trade with the enemy during the war. Yet it has served since
then as the basis for intervention which, during most of the time, has had noth-
ing to do with trade relations during wartime. The main feature of the ordi-
nance, which made it the legal basis for the regulatory system, the prohibi-
tion of any imports unless licensed by the "competent authority" appointed
by the government for this purpose. -
Duringthe first few years of the state's existence—the late 1940s and
early 1 950s—import licenses were issued by several competent authorities,
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withoutany central regulation, although most import items were the domain
of one ministry. This ministry has changed its name, as well as its structure
and some of its functions, several times; but since 1951 it has remained the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Along with an import license from the
relevant competent authority, an importer had to obtain a currency allocation
from the Controller of Foreign Exchange in the Ministry of Finance.
During 1952 the concept of the "foreign-exchange budget" was intro-
duced into the regulatory system. In early 1952 an experimental budget was
prepared for 1952_53.2 Later in the year, a Department of the Budget was
established within the Ministry of Finance, and it undertook the preparation
of a foreign-exchange budget, starting with the budget for 1953—54. From
then on until 1964, an annual foreign-exchange budget was prepared and
submitted for cabinet decision, along with the conventional parts of the gov-
ernment's budget. The government's basic policy decisions on the allocation
of foreign exchange were thus made in the adoption of the annual foreign-
exchange budget.
The preparation of a foreign-exchange budget followed normal pro-
cedure for budgetary planning. Some six months before the new fiscal year, the
department of the Budget would issue directions to the competent authorities
within the various ministries, providing them with rough guidelines for presen-
tation of foreign-exchange requirements.3 At the same time, the Budget De-
partment, with the help of the Foreign Exchange Department of the Ministry
of Finance, would make an estimate of forthcoming foreign-exchange receipts.
These receipts included export proceeds, unilateral cash transfers to Israel,
and long-term and some medium-term loans. The selection• of medium-term
loans to be included was left to the discretion of the Department of the Budget.
Short-term loans and the use of foreign-exchange reserves were not in-
cluded in estimated receipts. Most transfers in kind, whether unilateral or on
capital account, were included in the budget. This applied, among other things,
to some major items such as German reparations or U.S. food surpluses.
Minor transfers in kind, such as personal gifts or immigrants' personal effects,
were excluded.
When estimated requirements of the various competent authorities were
in hand, they were compared with estimated receipts and, not surprisingly,
the former were found to exceed the latter. The Budget Department, following
the normal course of budgetary negotiations with the ministries, then cut the
allocations to the various authorities and proposed a foreign-exchange budget.
This proposal was submitted by the Minister of Finance to the Cabinet Corn-
mittee for Economic Affairs and then to the cabinet as a whole. The adoption
of the budget by the cabinet made it an operational administrative directive.
In this last step, the foreign-exchange budget differed from the conventionalORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM OF QRS 29
parts of the budget, which the cabinet had to submit to the Knesset for
approval.
Once a foreign-exchange budget was approved by the cabinet, it pro-
vided a general allocation plan for the competent authorities. Within the
limits of the quotas allocated, each authority was empowered to issue import
licenses for the various items which it handled. An import license thus issued
had to be approved by the Controller of Foreign Exchange, whose function—
parallel to that of the government's controller in authorizing normal budgetary
expenditures—was to check whether the license indeed fell within the author-
ized budget. The approval by the Controller of Foreign Exchange made the
import license valid and also automatically resulted in commitment of the
required foreign exchange, which was then provided when payment for the
import was due. An exception to this rule was for import licenses labeled as
"without allocation of foreign exchange"; these included substantial categories
of import transactions, some of which will be mentioned later. Also subject to
the approval of the Controller of Foreign Exchange were the terms of pay-
ment (cash, supplier's credit for a certain duration, etc.) and the currency
of payment: the Controller could, and very often did, specify that only one
currency and no other could be allocated for the import for which a license
had been granted. This provision was mostly used to turn away imports from
"hard currency" countries to countries with which Israel had payments and
clearing agreements.
The foreign-exchange budget allocated licensing quotas among junctions
and purposes of the imports, rather than explicitly to competent authorities.
The most general classification specified four categories: consumption, im-
ports for exports, investment, and debt servicing (starting with the 1958—59
budget, services were separated from consumption and made into another
category). These were subdivided into a three-digit classification, correspond-
ing to the main industrial branches. The latter were then further divided by a
five-digit classification, and this was the one with effective meaning: each five-
digit item was handled by a particular competent authority. Five-digit items
could be physically similar but classified as separate items if intended for
purposes which were within the domains of separate authorities. For instance,
a truck would fall under one item if intended for use in an industrial plant, an-
other if intended for agricultural use, and still another if purchased for the use
of a port authority.
As mentioned, 1952—5 3 was the first year for which a foreign-exchange
budget was prepared, and the budget-making process in its entirety became
effective in 1953—54. The last year for which such a budget was prepared was
1964—65.Thebudgets for all these years, by major classifications of receipts



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM OF QRS 31
The aggregates presented in the table reveal some interesting phenomena.
First, it appears that actual receipts were consistently underestimated in the
budget. Therefore, since the principle of a balanced foreign-exchange budget
was always maintained, budgeted expenditures were always below actual re-
ceipts for the year.4 This was apparently not a coincidence, but resulted from a
deliberate policy of leaving in the budget some concealed, or implied, reserve
or safety margin. It could even be guessed, from the figures in Table 2-1,
that this was done by the use of some particular naive model, which was
known always to yield an underestimate. It may be observed that with the ex-
ception of the comparison of 195 6—57 with 195 5—56, the planned (i.e., antici-
pated) receipts of one budgetary year were remarkably similar to the actual
receipts of the preceding year; there is definitely a much closer similarity than
can be observed in comparisons of anticipated and realized receipts for the
same year. One may speculate that the budgetary planners used estimates of
receipts in the current year in which they were working as a projection, per-
haps with a few adjustments, of receipts for the next year, realizing (or, at
least, correctly hoping) that normally this would yield an underestimate of
receipts.
It also appears that in the large majority of the budgetary years, actual
expenditures were higher, mostly by a substantial margin, than planned ex-
penditures. This was made feasible partly by the availability of the surplus
of actual over anticipated receipts. Even so, it is worth inquiring what made
expenditures reach the higher levels, since automatic adjustments of expendi-
tures to receipts are obviously not provided in the budgetary mechanism.
The gap between actual and planned expenditures is explained in a num-
ber of ways. One is that supplementary budgets were very often presented and
adopted during the course of the year (a procedure, incidentally, often prac-
ticed in Israel with regard to the conventional parts of the government's
budget). In this way, the surplus of realized foreign-exchange receipts could
be allocated for expenditure. Thus, the foreign-exchange budget was, in effect,
quite flexible and subject to changes during the course of the year, a purpose
which was served by the practice of underestimating receipts.
Supplementary budgets were often prepared retrospectively. Expenditures
exceeding the sums allocated in the original budget were commonly made
without the sanction of a supplementary budget. The office of the Controller
of Foreign Exchange, which was in charge of. supervising the execution of the
budget through the authorization of import licenses, without which the licenses
were not valid, did not, as a rule, adhere too closely to the budget. It au-
thorized expenditures over the planned quotas, in amounts which were deter-
mined by something close to supply and demand forces, that is, by the amount
of pressure of potential importers (expressed through the various competent
authorities) and the size of the flow of foreign-exchange receipts. It also ap-32COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
pearsthat the Controller assumed, from experience, that importlicensesmight
not be fully utilized: some of them did not result in imports even after many
months. The Controller therefore issued import licenses beyond the amounts
allocated in the import plans, even without having an extra supply of foreign
exchange, anticipating that since the licenses would not be fully used, there
would be no extra pressure on the supply of foreign exchange.
In contrast to the case of foreign-exchange allocation among goods or
competent authorities, for which procedures existed, a mechanism or a set of
rules for allocating import quotas for goods among users or importers was
lacking. At the beginning, the "past trade" principle was apparently applied
most often; but according to the available evidence its importance declined as
time passed. Instead, in many cases, particularly when imports of raw mate-
rials were concerned, the decision on allocation was placed in the hands of
trade or manufacturers' associations: the entire quota would be turned over to
the association, which would allocate it among its members. This practice,
of course, granted an instrument of considerable power to the associations, a
factor which undoubtedly contributed to the prevalence of cartel-type agree-
ments at the time when QRs were strongly effective.
ii. THE SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM OF
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
One ideal measure of the severity of a OR system is the amount of excess
demand for each imported good at the controlled prices; or, more precisely,
the proportion of total demand that remains unsatisfied. A second measure is
the degree by which official prices underestimate the value of imports at pre-
vailing quantities to actual or potential buyers. With demand elasticities vary-
ing over time (in temporal comparisons) or among goods (in cross-sectional
comparisons), these two measures would not necessarily, of course, yield the
same ordering in the system in measuring the severity of controls for each im-
ported good, or the same answer in the analysis of developments over time.
Both, however, are conceptually legitimate measures, and, when large differ-
ences or large changes in the degree of restrictiveness are involved, the dif-
ferences in demand and supply elasticities become relatively less important
and the two measurements would tend to yield similar results. Quantity meas-
ures are discussed in this section; price indicators are taken up in the next two
sections.
The measurement of excess demand is, unfortunately, not feasible, and
there is probably no reliable information anywhere on this point. Even if con-
sumers or other potential buyers of imports were asked to estimate their short-
ages, the results would be unreliable. In any case, no such field survey has everTHE SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM OF QRS 33
been made in Israel. It has sometimes been suggested that the amount—size
or value—of unsatisfied applications for import licenses could be used instead.
But this measurement suffers from some serious flaws, even overlooking the
immense practical difficulties in any attempt to collect data on such applica-
tions.5 On the one hand, many applications for import licenses did not reflect
any actual demand for imports. In a QR system, where it is well known from
experience that a certain fraction of applications will get a negative response,
importers are naturally motivated to apply for licenses for amounts larger than
they actually need or intend to buy; this resulted, among other things, in the
phenomenon that a significant fraction of import licenses was not utilized.6
On the other hand, there is no doubt that some of the demand for imports
was not reflected in requests for import licenses, since potential applicants
for licenses may have decided that their applications stood no chance. When,
for instance, licenses were in effect allocated by a trade or manufacturing asso-
ciation, trying to bypass this procedure in applying for an import license
would be pointless. The competent authority would appear, in such cases, to
grant practically all the import licenses for which it received applications,
since applications would be restricted by the trade association to the total
quota available.
Thus, there does not seem to be a feasible way of estimating .excess de-
mand for imports directly, or even by proxy. Instead, a few indirect indica-
tions will be mentioned, starting with data on the foreign-exchange budgets.
As I pointed out earlier, the data in Table 2-1 show, as a rule, an excess
of foreign-exchange expenditures over the levels of planned expenditures and
anticipated receipts. During the earlier part of the period covered, actual ex-
penditures also usually exceeded actual foreign-exchange receipts. The budget-
ary year 1958—59 appears, on this score, to have been a turning point. From
that year on, actual expenditures, while continuing to exceed planned expen-
ditures—often by a substantial margin—always fell short of actual receipts,
again often by a significant margin. The two gaps combined are one of the
indications of the changing nature of the system of foreign-exchange controls.
The acute shortage of foreign exchange seems to have disappeared in the late
1950s, and the system was not designed any longer to serve the major purpose
of adjusting foreign-exchange expenditures—specifically on imports—to re-
ceipts. Indeed, by all available indications, the foreign-exchange budget ceased
to play any serious role during the early 1960s; its discontinuation after 1964—
65 was only a recognition of this fact.
Beginning in the late 1 950s, the continuing system of administrative regu-
lations was designed for purposes other than that of general adjustment of
foreign-exchange flows. One such major purpose, which will be discussed
later at greater length, was the protection of local industries from competing
imports. Another purpose was the regulation of capital transfers. It should34COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
bepointed out that during the later years, this meant not just prevention of
capital outflows, but also regulation of capital inflows. In time, the govern-
ment's objection to capital inflows strengthened, and regulations were made
(although not always strictly adhered to) to prevent capital inflows of short
duration and high interest rates. One source which was particularly discour-
aged was foreign suppliers' credit: the terms of the import license normally
specified payment in cash, rather than on credit. One of the major motives of
this rejection of foreign credit, besides the avoidance of interest payments
(whether explicit or implicit in the terms of purchase on credit) was the fear
of the effect of capital inflow on domestic liquidity. With a contractive domes-
tic monetary policy and tightening credit conditions, importers (as well as
banks or other domestic borrowers) tended to turn to credit from abroad. In
Israel's circumstances—a country with a high ratio of imports to production
and good access to foreign capital markets—unrestricted short-term capital
inflows could thus defeat any contractive policy. Indeed, the possibility of
abolishing foreign-exchange controls, which was contemplated on a number
of occasions, most seriously right after the devaluation of February 1962, was
rejected mainly on such grounds.
A similar indication, supporting (and to some extent repeating) the
observation made on the basis of the foreign-exchange budget, is the move-
ment of foreign-exchange reserves. The higher the reserves and the more they
tend to increase, the less severe are restrictions expected to be. The position
of Israel's external reserves is shown in Table 2-2.
This table shows that foreign-exchange reserves declined rapidly during
1949—51, and then remained close to zero during 1952 and 1953. In 1954
some reserves were re-established by a special operation,7 but remained at a
low level until 1958. From then on, Israel's external reserves rose markedly
and almost without interruption for a whole decade—until the middle of 1968.
Another indication of the severity of restrictions may be found by asking
what proportion of imports were in effect free, that is, suffered from no un-
satisfied demand. Such a measure does not indicate the degree of severity of
controls on imports which were not free; but it gives some idea of how impor-
tant these unsatisfied amounts could be in relation to total imports. In an
experimental study on thissubject, Rom tried to answer this question
by asking the persons in charge of each import item at the various competent
authorities whether that item was effectively restricted or free.8 Rom's study
relates to a single period of time, and so throws no light on the development
of the system over time. In addition, the method of inquiry could, at best,
yield only tentative results. Yet, it is worth looking into the findings of the
study, mainly for the impressions gained about the structure of the system.
Rom's study originated in an examination of the desirability of Israel's
joining the Common Market (the European Economic Community) when itTHE SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM OF QRs 35
TABLE2-2
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SOURCE: For 1948—59, Michael Michaely, Foreign Trade and Capital Imports in Israel
(TelAviv: Am Oved, 1953; in Hebrew). For 1960—72,Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1973,
TableVII/6.
a. Gross reserves, includingdeposits abroadof commercial banks and of the government
and foreign assets of the Bank of Israel.
wasformed. Since joining the Market would have involved an Israeli liberali-
zation, the aim of the study was to discover the goods which would not be
affected because they were already either formally or effectively liberalized.
The examination was concerned in principle with private imports only, and
excluded import items handled mainly by the government. The proportions
reported obviously related to total actual imports as influenced by restrictions,
a fact which raises problems too well known to be dwelt upon here. Rom
also asked officials at the competent authorities whether the liberalization of
import items which were effectively controlled was "possible" if duties were
levied on them. A negative answer to this question was most often based on
the assumption that the duty required would be, according to the person
asked, "too high." While all these are very crude estimates, based on personal
judgments, they may provide a tentative indication of the relative severity of
restrictions. On this basis, and with this limited and tentative interpretation,
imports are divided, in Table 2-3, into three groups: effective liberalization,
moderate restrictions, stringent restrictions.36COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
TABLE 2-3
Effectiveness of Import Restrictions, 1956










Raw materials 60 32 8 100
Finished goods 35 33 32 100
Total imports of goods 45 31 24 100
SOURCE: See accompanying text.
The indication provided by Table 2-3 is that close to half of total im-
ports in 1956 were effectively liberalized, and roughly a quarter were subject
to stringent restrictions. An earlier point must be emphasized here: these per-
centages are for the actual distribution of imports; weighting by shares of
industries in local production, or by hypothetical imports in the absence of
controls, would, of course, have resulted in a much higher degree of restric-
tion. It should be further noted that 60 per cent of raw materials were liberal-
ized, and that most other imports in this category were subject to only moder-
ate restrictions; that is, by 1956, imports of raw materials were by and large
not subject to severe controls, effective restrictions being mainly confined to
other categories of imports. Note also that the category of foodstuffs and
fodder, in contrast to the other two categories, was characterized by either full
liberalization or severe restriction. This impression is compatible with the
views prevailing at that time, which tended to classify imports of foodstuffs
as either "essential" and to be imported relatively freely or as "luxuries" and
to be discouraged. Data on effective exchange rates, which will be studied
later, also show a similar concentration of imports of this category at the
extreme ends of our classification.
iii. THE "IMPORTS-WITHOUT-PAYMENT" MARKET
A very interesting feature of the QR system in its earlier years was the institu-
tion known as the "imports-without-payment" (IWP) market.° It was the
most important attempt during the early 1950s to establish or regulate a
private foreign-exchange market parallel to the official one.
Supply in the IWP market originated from three acknowledged sources:
foreign capital transfers, immigrants' capital, and gifts from abroad.'° At theTHE "iMPORTS-WiTHOUT-PAYMENT" MARKET 37
end of 1948 the government allowed foreign investors to transfer their capital
in the form of goods from a specified list, on condition that foreign exchange
amounting to 30 per cent of the import license be sold to the Treasury at the
official rate. In effect, import licenses thus issued became, to a large extent,
marketable, although not in a sanctioned market. In July 1949, both the list
of categories exempt from the obligation of selling to the Treasury and the
list of goods which could be imported were extended. Most of the imported
goods allowed were "nonessential." This, plus a steep rise in the black-market
rate of foreign exchange, led the government to reverse course. In December
1949 and January 1950 new regulations were issued, narrowing the list of per-
mitted imports and prohibiting transfer of the right to import (by no longer
permitting an Israeli importer to deposit money in the restricted account of a
foreign investor). Likewise, in April 1950, IWPs from the United States and
Canada were disallowed altogether, although a few large transactions did
receive ad hoc permission. The level of imports covered by these regulations
fell considerably thereafter. This, together with rapidly mounting shortages,
led the government to reverse course once more.
In October 1950, this reversal and the regulations which followed during
the next two months led to what may be viewed as the classic form of imports
without payment, in which imports were made accessible to the original
owners of foreign capital as well as to Israeli residents; that is, transferability
of the right to import became legal. The Israeli importer became free to buy
foreign exchange from the transferer of capital at a rate determined by the
partners to the transaction. Import items eligible under this scheme were de-
termined by the government, and embraced nonessential as well as essential
goods. If imports belonged to the former category, foreign currency at a spec-
ified proportion of the value of the import license was to be submitted to
the Treasury at the formal rate of exchange; imports of essential goods were
exempt from this obligation. In effect, the government allocated licenses for
"imports without payment" during this period in the following way: 70 per
cent were allocated for the importation of construction materials; 20 per cent,
for importation of rubber tires; and 10 per cent, for other essential goods,
mainly construction materials for schools and hospitals. Licensees in the first
category were required to sell half the foreign exchange they bought in the
IWP market to the Treasury at the formal rate of exchange, using the other
half to finance their imports. The other two groups of licensees were exempt
from the currency-selling requirement.
Within a few months the policy was changed again. The rate of exchange
in the IWP market rose rapidly along with the black-market rate. This led
the government to intervene in the market by establishing a consortium of
importers, which became the only agent entitled to buy foreign exchange in
the market. Under terms of a regulation issued in April 1951, the rate of38COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
exchangefor these transactions was determined by the Treasury. The latter
first stabilized the existing rate and then actually lowered it. Initially, this had
little effect on the size of the market. But within a few months, the disparity
between the black-market rate, which was rising sharply, and the rate in the
IWP market became wide enough for the supply of foreign exchange in the lat-
ter market to fall drastically. In the latter half of 1951, the IWP market there-
fore came to be confined again, in the main, to various transactions approved
ad hoc by the government.
"Imports without payment" originated in response to a number of cir-
cumstances, and were intended to satisfy several governmental goals. The lat-
ter were not always consistent, and the inconsistency (as well as changes in
circumstances) contributed to the many fluctuations in the nature and opera-
tion of the market. Basically, the conflict was between two objectives. On the
one hand, the government wanted to use the IWP market as a vehicle for
encouraging various kinds of capital inflows by giving them a premium over
the official exchange rate. This was accomplished by using these capital im-
ports for the importation of goods that commanded high domestic prices: the
premium involved would be the excess of the prevailing domestic price over
that yielded by the official rate of exchange (allowing for transportation, mar-
keting, etc.). Reaching this target thus called for high premiums and, hence,
importation of goods with high local prices. Another objective of the govern-
ment, leading in the same direction, was to provide an outlet for spending
some of the involuntary accumulation of money by making available some
goods not provided by the controlled market. On the other hand, the govern-
ment was particularly anxious to increase imports of "essential" goods, which
were usually subject to low ceiling prices. In addition, the government was
reluctant to let effective exchange rates in the IWP market rise very high, lest
the credibility of the official rate be impaired.
After the formal devaluation of February 1952, no attempt was made to
reestablish a regulated IWP market. From then on these imports consisted to
an increasing extent of gifts, bona fide or otherwise. The market for gifts of
food packages became increasingly organized, and much of the capital transfer
to the country was illegally channeled through this market. Instead of trans-
mitting actual parcels of food prepaid abroad, a few companies were estab-
lished that provided food items to local recipients in exchange for scrip cer-
tificates which were paid for abroad (mainly in the United States). Within a
short time these certificates became transferable, first illegally and then, after
bearer certificates were allowed, in effect with official approval. The scrip
companies were entitled to import food, having committed themselves to
transfer a given proportion (42.5 per cent) of their foreign-exchange proceeds
at the formal rate to finance local purchases of food, a commitment which
was not strictly observed. During 1955 the scrip arrangements were abolishedTHE "IMPORTS-WITHOUT-PAYMENT" MARKET 39
and the IWP market lost its importance as a channel of imports except for
imports in kind by immigrants or through bona fide gifts, which, of course,
went on. The size of the IWP category during its years of significance is shown
in Table 2-4.
TABLE 2-4
Imports Without Payment, 1949—54
194919501951195219531954
Total imports of goods (millions of
dollars) 253.1302.0383.7324.1282.1290.3
Imports without payment (millions of
dollars) 38.651.271.365.159.842.7
Source of financing of imports without
0
payment (per cent): 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Capital transfers 42.840.944.344.740.222.5
Immigrants' transfers 39.529.117.014.6 5.0 3.6
Gifts 17.730.038.740.734.848.8
Other — — — — 20.025.1
SOURCE: Michael Michaely, Israel's Foreign Exchange Rate System (Jerusalem: Falk
Institute, 1971; in English), Table 2-3.
For most of the period, data on prices paid in the IWP market are scarce.
In studies of that period it is mentioned that during the first half of 1949, when
IWP licenses were in effect largely transferable, they were sold to importers
at a price ranging from 20 to 25 per cent of the import value. Since the im-
porter at that time was obliged to sell foreign exchange equivalent to 30 per
cent of the import value to the Treasury at the formal rate and presumably
bought the currency in the black market, at a rate which was about 25 per
cent above parity at that time, this price meant a premium of over 30 per cent
for the import license. This seems to be a rather modest premium.1' Later data
show a rapidly growing disparity (see Table 2-5).
The observations in Table 2-5 for 1949 and 1950 may be viewed as illus-
trative, tentative samples. The data for 1951, on the other hand, are complete
and precise: they refer to the uniform, publicized rate that applied in the
organized market at that time. Special attention should be paid to the period
of January—March 1951, during which the rate of exchange in the IWP mar-
ket was completely free.'2 During that period the implied rate of exchange for
imports of construction materialwas about six times the formal rate of
exchange. This ratio is quite close, as will soon be seen, to the size of dispari-
ties between free and official prices of foodstuffs, as well as those of other40COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
TABLE2-5
Foreign-Exchange Rates in the
Imports-Without-Payment (IWP) Market, 1949—51
ExchangeImplied Exchange
Rate Rate for ImportsRatio ofRatio of
in IWPof ConstructionCol. 1 toCot. 2 to
Market Materialsa Formal Formal
(IL per $) (IL per $) Rateb Rateb
Period (1) (2) (3) (4)
1949:October—November.446—.500 — 1.3—1.5
December .666—.900 — 1.9—2.5
1950:April .625—.645 — 1.7—1.8 —
1951:January 1.250 2.143 3.5 6.0
February—March 1.300 2.243 3.6 6.3
April 1.100 1.843 3.1 5.2
May—June 0.990 1.623 2.8 4.5
July—December 0.930 1.503 2.6 4.2.
SOURCE: Based on Michaely, Foreign Exchange System, Table 2-4.
a. It will be recalled that an importer of construction materials had to surrender to the
Treasury, at the formal rate, half of the foreign exchange bought by him in the imports-without-
payment market. If r0 is the formal rate, r8 the rate in the imports-without-payment market,
the implied rate for construction materials, and p the fraction surrendered to the Treasury, then
=(r,—pr0)/(1—p);if r0 =0.357,and p =0.5,then=2r8—0.357.
b. The formal rate of exchange was IL 0.333 per dollar until November 1949, and IL 0.357
per dollar from then on until February 1952.
goods, during this period. This similarity may be assumed to be even closer
for later periods, for which direct information about the market rate is not
available. It will be recalled that from 1952 to 1954 the scrip certificates were
the main instrument of the semiorganized IWP market. Purchases by scrip ar-
rangements were apparently the main source of supply of foodstuffs in the
black market at that time. With a considerable degree of perfection and arbi-
trage in the markets, it may be presumed that the foreign-exchange rate im-
plied by the price of the scrip certificates was related to the formal rate of
exchange in about the same ratio as between free-market and official food
prices.
iv. PRICES IN OTHER "BLACK" AND FREE MARKETS
The IWP market yielded some price data by which the severity of the OR
system can be inferred. This is, of course, rather fragmentary evidence. WhilePRICES IN OTHER "BLACK" AND FREE MARKETS 41
no data are available to provide a full measure of the severity of controls, as
would be reflected by the gap between actual and demand prices for the im-
ports allowed by the system's quotas, a few other fragments may be found
which taken together serve as additional indicators. These are prices paid
outside the control system—either legally where free markets existed in addi-
tion to the controlled, rationed markets, or illegally in black markets, or in
the so-called grey markets where transactions were made at freely determined
prices without official sanction but presumably with the knowledge of the
government.
At the peak of the control system, during the early 1950s, entirely free
markets were few and mainly confined to services. Imports, or goods with a
high import content, were almost universally rationed and subject to price
ceilings, the most important exception once more being imports made under
the IWP plan. Noncontrolled prices were thus usually prices paid in black
markets. While it was a matter of common knowledge that these markets were
widespread, and that prices paid in them were far above the official prices,
actual data about black-market commodity prices are quite scarce. Aside from
wanting to avoid the difficulty involved in collecting price data in unorganized,
widely fluctuating, and illegal markets, the government was reluctant to en-
courage the collection of such data, because its doing so might have been
interpreted as giving some legal sanction to these transactions. Furthermore,
by governmental direction, the Central Bureau of Statistics based cost-of-liv-
ing index calculations only on official prices. It was reluctant to investigate
black-market prices, or even the few free legal prices that existed alongside the
(lower) official prices. This inhibition was due to the attempt to keep the cost-
of-living index from rising (and even, during part of the period, to lower it),
mainly in order to mitigate pressure for wage increases.
By way of exception, the Central Bureau of Statistics did collect free-
market data on food prices; these were not published or publicized at the time
but were made available for later investigations. In one study, these data were
used to construct an index of free-market food prices for comparison with the
index of official prices.14 Since these indexes exclude fruits and vegetables
from the food category, the remaining food items include (particularly in ear-
lier years) a very high import component—certainly much over 50 per cent
on the average—and are, therefore, relevant in the present examination. The
results, presented in Table 2-6, are quite revealing and clearly indicate the
developments over the period.
For several years controls grew increasingly severe. They reached a peak
in 1951, when free-market prices were seven times higher than official ceiling
prices.'5 Beginning in the first half of 1952 the severity of controls declined
consistently and rapidly, a movement clearly associated with official price
trends, which will be surveyed later in this chapter. This downward movement42COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
TABLE 2-6
Ratio of Free-Market to Official Prices of Food, 1949—58
(half-yearly averages)
Period Ratio Period Ratio
1949 First half 3.1 1954 First half 2.7
Second half 4.2 Second half 2.9
1950 First half 5.3 1955 First half 2.5
Second half 6.1 Second half 2.6
1951 First half 7.0 1956 First half 2.5
Second half 6.8 Second half 1.6
1952 First half 6.1 1957 First half 1.8
Second half 5.2 Second half 1.5
1953 First half 3.9 1958 First half 1.5
Second half 2.9 Second half 1.7
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Yoram Weiss, "Price Control in Israel, 1939—1963"
(M .A. diss., Hebrew University, 1964; in Hebrew), Table C-i. Weiss used estimates of family
expenditures as weights in his index of free-market prices. The indices include sixteen food
items.
became very slight from the second half of 1953 to the first half of 1956, a
period in which the severity of controls seems to have been virtually stable
at a level substantially lower than during the early 1 950s but still significant.
In the second half of 1956, the severity of controls, as measured by the ratio
in Table 2-6, declined perceptibly. The excess of free-market over official
prices was only about 50 to 70 per cent from then on, indicating a system
of controls of limited "bite" by comparison with the system of the early
1950s.
It is interesting to compare the relationship of these price indicators to
indicators of quantities. Again, actual estimates of quantities of excess demand
in the controlled markets are obviously not available. Table 2-7 shows the
proportion to all food expenditures of expenditures for foods subject to ceil-
ing-price regulations and rationing. These data (available only on a yearly
basis) show the same movements as those of Table 2-6, and the association
of the two could hardly be a coincidence.16 The severity of controls must have
increased until 1951, and then decreased because of changes both in the num-
ber of items controlled and in the strictness of the regulations affecting them,
and the two components were probably closely correlated.
The series for food prices, just discussed, is apparently the most complete
and organized set of data available on free-market prices of goods. Other
pieces of information are only casual examples a few of which are presented
in Table 2-8. The first two sections of the table show results quite similar toPRICES IN OTHER "BLACK" AND FREE MARKETS 43
TABLE 2-7
Controlled Food Items as a Proportion of
Total Food Expenditures, 1948—59
Year Proportion Year Proportion
1948 15.6% 1954 69.0%
1949 62.1 1955 67.1
1950 89.7 1956 55.7
1951 94.6 1957. 47.9
1952 89.4 1958 43.0
1953 80.8 1959 21.6
SouRcE: Weiss, "Price Control," Table C-4.
those derived from the data on food prices. Free-market prices were much
higher than official prices, generally three to ten times as high. Also, although
these two parts are not strictly comparable, it appears that the disparity be-
tween the two prices grew between September 1950 and January 1951, as
indicated particularly by the free-market price movement of certain con-
struction materials; this again agrees with the indication provided by food
prices. The data in the third part of Table 2-8 also show a substantial dis-
parity between free-market and official prices; but it is considerably lower than
in the earlier series, ranging only between 1.4 and 2.5. In part, this is probably
a reflection of the general movement toward reduced disparity, which started
early in 1952 with major boosts of official prices. But it may well be that in the
clothing industry, to which the data of this part of the table refer, the excess
of free-market over official prices was indeed generally lower than in cate-
gories such as food or construction materials.'7
Finally, a most interesting price for the purpose at hand is the black-
market rate of foreign exchange. In principle, this price does not necessarily
reflect price disparities in the import of goods. Foreign exchange might be
bought in the black market not in order to finance current purchases, but as
an asset to be held for some length of time, either for its direct yield or in
anticipation of a future rise of the black-market rate itself or of the local price
of imported goods and services which the foreign exchange could buy.'8 In-
deed, in later years, when the scope of the foreign-exchange black market was
small, much of the demand in this market was most likely due to such motiva-
tion.19 In the earlier years, on the other hand, most of the foreign exchange
bought in the black market was probably intended for the purchase of imports
of goods and services. The IWP market discussed above was probably the
most important channel for imports of goods. When the black-market rate is
compared with estimates of the IWP rate, for periods when the latter was uni-44COMPREHENSIVECONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
TABLE2-8
Free-Market Versus Official Prices, Specified Dates, 1950—52
(prices in Israeli pounds per unit)
Official Free Ratioof
Price Price (2)to(1)
Commodity (1) (2) (3)
September 1950
Plywood (m3) 110.0 330.0 3.0
Soft wood (m8) 22.5 70.0 3.1
Construction iron (ton) 55.0 500.0 9.1
Cement (ton) 10.0 25.0 2.5
Wool, locally woven (m) 2.8 10.0 3.6
Wool, English (m) 4.5 20.0 4.4
January 1951
Cotton thread (kg.) 1.05 6.00 5.7
Wool thread (kg.) 2.00 20.00 10.0
Wool yarn (m) 5.00 10.00 2.0
Linen, low quality (m) 0.26 130 5.0
Linen, high quality (m) 0.78 2.50 3.2
Cement (ton) 11.00 85.00
Construction iron (ton) 100.00 500.00 5.0
Soft wood (m3) 33.00 160.00 4.8
Pipes, 1/2 in. (m) 0.15 0.95 6.3
Glass (m2) 0.60 5.00 8.3
August 1952
Men's wool suit (pr.) 45.00 100.00 2.2
Wool "utility" trousers (pr.) 17.00 35.00 2.1
Men's underwear (pr.) 0.51 1.25 2.5
Nylon stockings (pr.) 1.75 3.00 1.7
Silk (unit not specified) 3.00 5.00 1.7
Men's pajamas (pr.) 10.36 23.75 2.3
Sheet 3.27 8.00 2.4
Bath towel 0.73 1.50 2.1
Diaper 0.66 1.50 2.3
Men's shoes (pr.) 10.05 15.00 1.5
Women's shoes (pr.) 8.34 12.00 1.4
m =meter. m3 =cubicmeter.
m2 =squaremeter. kg =kilogram.
SOURCE: September 1950 and January 1951—Weiss, "Price Control," Table C-16 (based
on newspaper reports); August 1952—internal memorandum of the Ministry of Finance
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form and freely determined in the market, the two rates are indeed found to
be very similar (although the number of such observations is rather small).
It may thus be presumed that for the first few years, black-market foreign-
exchange rates reflect quite well the excess of free-market prices over official
prices. The black market for foreign exchange was always well organized,
with rather uniform rates prevailing.20 The black-market rate was, therefore,
well known and well publicized.
The impression gained from the quarterly data on exchange rates in
Table 2-9 is quite strong and rather similar to that conveyed by the other
pieces of evidence presented previously. The ratio of the black-market to the
formal rate was at first, in 1949, only slightly above unity, and was rising only
slowly. But in 1950, and even more significantly in 1951, the disparity be-
tween the two rates grew rapidly and very substantially. At the peak in late
1951 the black-market rate was roughly seven times that of the formal rate—
a ratio quite similar to the disparity shown earlier between free-market and
official food prices as well as to disparities in prices of other goods. For a
number of years beginning in early 1952, the black-market rate was roughly
stable, while the formal rate climbed steadily. The disparity between the two
thus went down, gradually but considerably, until in 1955 it again reached the
same low level as in 1949. From then on, the black-market rate rarely ex-
ceeded the formal rate by more than 20 to 30 per cent.21 Considering the
other sources of demand for foreign exchange in the black market—mainly
for speculation—this small disparity probably indicates that only a small por-
tion of demand at the existing formal rates (combined, of course, with the
effect of tariffs and similar levies on imports) was left unsatisfied by the gov-
ernment's allocation mechanism.
v. THE POLICY SHIFT: FROM QUANTITATIVE
RESTRICTIONS TO USE OF THE
PRICE MECHANISM
All the available indications thus show the same time pattern: a system of
quantitative restrictions growing in severity in 1949 and the early 1950s, and
reaching a peak in late 1951 and early 1952, when QRs, as measured by the
gap between official and free-market prices, were very severe indeed. Begin-
fling early in 1952, this trend started to reverse itself, until by about 1956 the
system of QRs had almost been ended as an instrument for regulating total
imports and keeping them substantially lower than they would have been
otherwise.
The changing nature and intensity of the OR system could conceivably
be explained by acëidental circumstances, such as the appearance and dis-46COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
appearance of sources of capital imports. To some extent, it might have been
so, but there seems to be little doubt that the pattern of development of the QR
system is to be viewed primarily as a change in policy; it is one side of a coin,
the other side of which was a switch (to which occasional references have
TABLE 2-9
Black-Market Rate of Foreign Exchange, Quarterly, 1949—56
(Israeli pounds per dollar)
Black-Market Rate Formal Rate Ratio of(1) to (2)
Perioda (1) (2) (3)
1949: I 0.379] 1.1
II 0.425k 0.333 1.3
III 0.419J 1.3
1949: IV 0.498 1.4
1950: I 0.573 1.6
II 0.635 1.8
III 0.748 2.1





1952: I 2.583 0.460 5.6
II 2.663 0.700 3.8
III 2.544 0.800 3.2
IV 2.240 0.790 2.8
1953: I 2.511 0.770 3.3
II 2.400 0.800 3.0
III 2.314 0.880 2.6
IV 2.442 0.890 2.7
1954: I 2.763 1.240 2.2
II 2.613 1.420 1.8
III 2.553 1.680 1.5
IV 2.495 1.710 1.4
1955: I 2.300 1.3
II 2.225 1.2
III 2.263 1.2
IV 2.423 1.800 1.3
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Notes to Table 2-9.
SouRcE:
Cot. 1—For 1949!, 194911, and 1952111, Don Patinkin, The Israel Economy: The First
Decade(Jerusalem:Falk Project for Economic Research, 1959; in English), App. B; data for
other years compiled from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1955—56 and 1957—58.
Cot. 2—Michael Michaely, Israel's Foreign Exchange Rate System, Part II, Tables (Jeru-
salem: Falk Project for Economic Research, 1968; in Hebrew).
a. For 19491, 194911, 1952111, and 19521V, the black-market rate is for the end of the
quarter; other black-market data are quarterly averages of end-of-month rates. Formal rates
are quarterly averages weighted by size of imports.
been made) to reliance on the price mechanism for regulating the balance of
payments. A detailed description and analysis of this change will be presented
in Chapter 5. Here it will be only briefly outlined.
From the establishment of the state of Israel until early 1952, the effec-
tive price of foreign exchange in the import trade was almost constant. Aside
from a slight increase of a few percentage points in the formal rate in Septem-
ber 1949, no formal devaluation was undertaken. Customs duties and other
levies on imports also changed very little during these years. Thus, the effec-
tive rate of exchange with the dollar in the import trade, which includes these
duties, changed between 1949 and 1951 (yearly averages) from IL 0.386 to
IL 0.395perdollar—an increase of just about 2 per cent. The stability of the
rate was probably due to the notion prevailing in the government at that time
that cheap imports were essential to maintain a minimum standard of living for
all segments of the population and to keep the general price level stable—a
purpose which came to be regarded as a target in itself.
The policy switch occurred in early 1952, and the execution of the new
policy took close to three years. On February 14, 1952, the New Economic
Policy was announced—a name fully justified by the events. The essence of
this policy was a process of progressive devaluation, accompanied by a paral-
lel increase of domestic (controlled) prices and undertaken within a context
of restrictive demand policy. A multiple exchange rate system was introduced,
and the average rate kept rising by the shifting of transactions from lower to
higher rates. While the formal rate on the eve of this process was IL 0.357
per dollar, by its end, around mid-1954, almost all transactions were con-
ducted at a rate of IL 1.800 per dollar. The formal rate thus increased about
fivefold within this period. At the same time, import duties and other levies
were also raised; these actions contributed to the increase in the effective rate
of exchange, although the contribution was minor, by comparison with that
of the formal devaluation. The effective rate of exchange in import transac-
tions thus increased, from 1951 to the end of 1954, by about 450 per cent.
From then on until the devaluation of 1962, changes in the effective exchange
rates, which were introduced only through changes in import duties or in ex-48COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
port subsidies, were very moderate—on the average, just a few percentage
points per year.
The recorded increase in domestic prices, which reflects primarily
changes in controlled (legal) prices, was also very substantial: from 1951 to
1953 this price level about doubled, and it further increased by some 10 per
cent from 1953 to 1954. The "true" price level increased substantially less:
free-market (or black-market) prices not only failed to rise to the same extent
as did official prices, but sometimes they actually declined. But even in com-
parison with official prices—though they closely reflect changes in import
prices, introduced primarily through changes in the exchange rate—the rela-
tive level of the rate of exchange (PLD-EER)22 increased substantially during
the period of progressive devaluation. From 1951 to 1955 the PLD-EER
increased by about 170 per cent—an average annual (compounded) rise of
close to 30 per cent.
The substantial rise in the relative level of the exchange rate—and,
through it, of the level of import prices in relation to domestic prices—would
be expected to lead to a reduction of demand for imports. This indeed ap-
pears to have happened on a very large scale; and, although any statistical
inference based on simple comparisons of various time series must be regarded
as suggestive rather than firmly conclusive, the chronological association of
the series in this instance is too striking to be dismissed as accidental. Imports
actually declined after 1951, measured at constant prices, and only in 1955
did they again reach the 1951 level. In proportion to GNP, the decline of
imports during these years was striking—from over 52 per cent in 1951 to 33
per cent in 1954.23
The decline in imports during 1952—54 is all the more spectacular when
considered in conjunction with the development of the QR system. It has been
shown that after the first half of 1952 the degree of severity of the controls
declined rapidly. The very bold use of the price mechanism, by which relative
prices of imports were almost tripled, thus led to the simultaneous achieve-
ment of two purposes: the reduction in the size of imports (in relation to
the level of the national product); and the scrapping of QRs as a major policy
instrument for the regulation of imports. Altogether, the New Economic
Policy of 1952—54 and related developments may be considered an out-
standing example of the substitution of the price mechanism for regulation
through quantitative restrictions.
vi. LIBERALIZATION AND THE NATURE
OF THE REMAINING QRs
By the mid-1950s, then, the QR system no longer served as a major instru-
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ing the near exhaustion of external reserves due to the cost of the Sinai cam-
paign of October 1956 and the eôonomic sanctions imposed by the United
States government, the reimposition of more stringent controls was exten-
sively debated within the government, but finally rejected. From then on the
use of this instrument was not seriously contemplated, although during epi-
sodes of particularly strong balance-of-payments pressure it has occasionally
been advocated in the press or by individual government officials.
The relaxation of restrictions was, however, not uniform:it applied
mostly to raw materials and, to a smaller extent, to finished investment goods,
rather than to finished consumer goods. This pattern of liberalization was in-
dicated by the data in Table 2-3. It is also supported by the data in Table
2-10, which show the changing structure of imports during the late 1950s. The
TABLE 2-10
Distribution of Main Categories of Imports, 1951—59
195119521953195419551956195719581959
Value (millions of dollars)





Percentage of total imports





SOURCE: Michaely, Foreign Trade, Table 28.
decline in the share of finished consumer goods and the rise in the share of
raw materials can be clearly seen: the former category declined over the
period from about one-quarter of total imports to less than half of this frac-
tion, while the latter increased from over a third to over a half of the total.
Put differently, imports of final consumer goods declined over the period in
absolute (dollar) terms, and very markedly so in relation to national income,
while imports of raw materials almost doubled in absolute terms, rising at
approximately the same rate as the national income and product. This change
in the composition of imports might conceivably have been due to other fac-50COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
tors,particularly to relative price movements. However, data presented later
in this study, on sectoral movements in exchange rates, do not support this
hypothesis. Higher elasticities of demand for imports of consumer goods than
for other imports, which again will be indicated later in this study, do prob-
ably provide a partial explanation for the decline in the share of final con-
sumer goods. But this decline was so substantial during this period that it
must in all probability reflect the c9ncentration of quantitative restrictions in
this sector.
Liberalization of imports of raw materials was carried out gradually,
without specific policy declarations, by increasing the ratio of allowed im-
ports to total import applications. Accompanying the rise of this ratio were
accommodating changes in the administration of the system, such as a gradual
shift from ad hoc grants of specific import licenses for each individual ship-
ment to general import licenses. The only liberalization explicitly announced
during the 1950s took place in early 1956 and involved the importation of a
few major raw materials, such as lumber and hides and leather. These imports
were declared unrestricted, although the government still retained the right
to dictate the source of purchase. In practice, this meant that the government
could direct the importer, when this seemed feasible, to buy from one of the
countries with which Israel had at that time a trade surplus under a bilateral
clearing agreement. At the same time—and this was a specific example of the
replacement of QRs by the price mechanism—special levies were imposed on
these liberalized imports.
By 1957, most imports of raw materials were, in effect, liberalized. The
nonliberalized items belonged mainly to two categories. One, quite substantial
in size, consisted of raw materials for the food industry. Imports of these
goods were concentrated largely (about 70 to 80 per cent) in the hands of
the government, and private imports of items purchased by the government
were not allowed at all. This practice started during World War II, when food
imports were handled by the British Middle-Eastern Supply Center in Cairo.
For several reasons, the practice has to a large extent continued to this day,
although the list of governmental import items has narrowed down. One rea-
son for its continuance is a belief that the government, as a single purchaser,
would do better than private traders in these import markets, due to the value
of its monopsonistic position. Likewise, local consumers of these essential
goods would be better protected from monopolistic exploitation if the govern-
ment were the seller of the import in the local market—by virtue of which
role, the government also regulates the price of the final product (such as
bread, edible oil, or sugar). A further alleged consideration is that the govern-
ment must maintain substantial stockpiles of foods for emergencies. For
largely similar reasons, the government has also always been the sole importer
of fuel oil, which is the largest single import item. By the second half of theLIBERALIZATION AND THE NATURE OF THE REMAINING QRS 51
1 950s,thehandling of imports by the government was exclusively due to such
reasons and had almost no connection with the general balance-of-payments
situation: excess demand for these raw materials in the local market was the
exception, rather than the rule.
The other category of nonliberalized imports of raw materials may be
characterized not by the nature of the goods but by the motivation for restric-
tions, which are found not on the import but on the export side. As will be
explained in Chapter 4, during most of the 1950s, a principal means of en-
couraging exports was the linking of the right to an import license for raw
materials to production for export. In order for this system to be in any way
influential, such imports must have involved quota profits. Although the
generation of such profits was not an original purpose of the imposition of
restrictions, it quite often was the reason for not removing effective restrictions
on the raw materials involved. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, restric-
tions motivated by this purpose mostly disappeared, although it is not entirely
clear whether imports were liberalized because the linkage of imports to ex-
ports was discontinued as an export policy, or whether the policy was dis-
continued since the spreading of liberalization of imports of raw materials
made it ineffective; quite possibly, it was a double-edged movement in this
direction.
By the mid-1950s, therefore, imports of raw materials were largely lib-
eralized, and by the early 1960s this liberalization—in the sense of an
absence of excess demand at existing prices—was almost complete. This was
by no means the case, however, with other imports. Imports of final goods,
particularly final consumer goods, were restricted very effectively, and impor-
tation of many items was prohibited. These restrictions were due not to bal-
ance-of-payments considerations, but to the policy of protecting import-com-
peting domestic industries. Consequently, this policy also applied to imports of
certain raw materials which competed with local production, although these
imports were not very sizable.
From the very beginning of the operation of foreign-exchange controls
and the OR system, the general directive given to the competent authorities
was to prohibit any imports of goods which were produced domestically. A
declaration by a local manufacturer to the Ministry of Commerce and Indus-
try that he was producing a given item was usually sufficient basis for the
ministry to prohibit imports of that item. During the 1 950s a public commis-
sion "for the protection of local industries," which was associated with the
ministry, operated with the announced purpose of deciding on requests for
protection. In effect, it served exactly the opposite purpose: since protection
by total import prohibition was afforded almost automatically, the commission
handled applications of importers who argued that in their specific cases, im-
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duction.The commission was willing to consider such applications on the
grounds that local production did not meet necessary quality specifications;
that it could not be provided on time; or that its prices were excessive. The
commission had a rule for deciding upon the last ground: a gap of over 50
per cent between the local and the foreign price was declared to be excessive.24
If the good concerned was an input to an export good, a gap of over 25 per
cent was considered as the limit. Later, in 1958, an advisory council recom-
mended changing this rule so as to grant local production which competed
with imports an effective protection rate equal to the premium rate given to
value added in exports (at that time, roughly 50 to 60 per cent) plus an addi-
tional rate that would vary according to the type of good—from a minimum
of 15 per cent for raw materials to a maximum of 40 per cent for finished con-
sumer goods.25 In effect, however, these rules were far from serving as opera-
tional policy directives. Decisions were made ad hoc, and occasions on which
imports were allowed because local prices were found to be excessive were
rare indeed.28
The policy of total protection by import prohibition was comprehensive
in its application to final consumer goods. With respect to raw materials and
investment goods, on the other hand, the principle of protection of local in-
dustry could not lead to a clear-cut policy, since the protection of one local
industry in these categories was necessarily at the expense of other industries
using the raw materials or the machines and tools. Most raw materials could
not, in any case, be replaced by local production or a local substitute within a
relevant price range. Of those which could, some indeed became subject to
import prohibition or restriction, although each case, facing strong opposition,
was decided only after much discussion rather than in an automatic fashion;
raw materials for the plastics industry are a case in point. Most investment
goods, too, particularly imports of heavy industrial equipment, could not,
during the 1 950s, be feasibly replaced by local products; yet many goods, such
as tools or replacement parts, could technically be produced locally. In these
instances no automatic protection was granted. Although reliable quantitative
estimates are not available, the general impression gained from students of
Israel's industry and officials administrating the machinery is thai, as a rule,
the policy was not to protect such local industries by import prohibition. This
impression is also borne out by data on effective exchange rates, presented
later in this analysis.
On the whole, then, it seems that a clear distinction among categories
can be made: protection of industries producing final consumer goods by im-
port prohibition was comprehensive and almost universal; protection of in-
dustries producing raw materials and investment goods was sporadic, and
probably applied only to the minority of instances in which local production
was technically feasible.GEOGRAPHIC DISCRIMINATION 53
vii. GEOGRAPHIC DISCRIMINATION
On the whole, geographic discrimination was never a very important trait of
Israel's import policy and of the system of quantitative restrictions. When the
OR system was at its peak, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, there was
only a minor attempt at governmental restriction of the source of purchase (al-
though, technically, each import license designated the currency of payment
and the country of supply, and was not valid for purchases under other cir-
cumstances). The reason for this surprising largess was a relative abundance,
even at that period, of "hard" currencies. Exports in these years covered only
a small fraction of imports, which were mainly financed by capital transfers.
The latter, in turn, comprised mostly convertible or, at least, semiconvertibie
currencies. At the beginning, one important source of capital imports was the
relatively large frozen sterling reserve (over $100 million), which was freed
for use in early 1950 by agreement with the British government and was
mostly exhausted during the following two years. Although sterling was not
then a perfectly convertible currency, its convertibility within a wide area—
in addition to the potential importance of the United Kingdom itself as a
source of supply in a free world market—was sufficient to insure that the
importer was not normally hampered by having to pay in sterling.
More important over most of the period were capital transfers from the
United States, by way of loans and grants from the U.S. government and
American Jewry. The dollars received were partly used to finance import sur-
pluses from other countries, where the specific imports required (or allowed)
were cheaper. Later, beginning in 1953, reparations payments from the Ger-
man government became one of the major sources of capital imports. By the
reparations agreement, purchases financed from this source were confined
(except from a certain fraction used to pay the United Kingdom for oil
imports) to German goods in agreed-upon categories. While the goods
purchased in this way were not normally more expensive in Germany than
elsewhere, the restriction on the use of these funds certainly led to some shift
in the commodity composition of imports, although this effect diminished with
the years. Beginning in 1954, German restitution payments to individuals were
added as still another major source of capital imports. Except during a very
short period at the beginning, these payments were made in a currency which
was convertible for most practical purposes. All in all, the availability of con-
vertible capital transfers obviated the need for any extensive geographic re-
direction of the import trade by the government.
Paradoxically, significant geographic discrimination started only in 1953,
when the general restrictiveness of the system was already rapidly diminishing.
This discrimination clearly originated on the export side. In those years, as54COMPREHENSIVECONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
some capacity for industrial exports developed, it was assumed thatsuchex-
ports would flow provided there was access to protected foreign markets, the
instrument for protection being bilateral trade and payments agreements. Con-
sequently, Israel entered into a number of such agreements, in which the
partner country was to purchase from Israel mainly industrial products while
Israel would buy in exchange mainly foodstuffs and raw materials. The most
important partner country to such an agreement was Turkey, with Yugoslavia
coming next. Stated in terms of convertible currencies, Israel's imports from
these countries were clearly more expensive than similar goods in the free
world market. Obviously, each of the partners to such an agreement tried to
sell to the other its most expensive goods and to exclude exports which could
compete freely in convertible-currency markets. Although Israel used a spe-
cific price mechanism designed to compensate importers for these price differ-
ences, as will be pointed out later in this study, this mechanism in itself was
quite often inadequate; so the government resorted to the QR system as a
means of directing Israel's import trade toward its partner countries.27
The share of Israel's trade within the framework of payments agree-
ments inthe country's total trade during the 1950s is shown in Table
2-11. The bilateral trade flows with each partner country were roughly in
balance most of the time, since autonomous capital transfers from these
countries were relatively unimportant. (And since, of course, neither Israel's
nor the other partner's currency was convertible, trade surpluses would be
something of a waste.) In Israel's over-all trade, imports were several times
TABLE 2-11
Shareof Exports and Imports of Goods
Under Bilateral Payments Agreements, 1950—59












SOURCE: Michaely, Foreign Trade, Table 47.NOTES 55
the size of exports; therefore, trade under payments agreements made up a
much larger share of Israel's exports than its imports. During the years
1953—55, which appear as the peak period for trade under payments agree-
ments, exports to partner countries under trade agreements constituted about
two-fifths of Israel's total exports (and, it should be mentioned, the greater
part of its exports apart from the two traditional export items of citrus fruit
and polished diamonds); whereas imports from these countries reached only
about one-sixth of its total imports. While the latter fraction is not insignifi-
cant, it seems that even at the peak, geographic discrimination in imports was
not a major factor. From 1956 on, trade under payments agreements declined
rapidly, although this was felt more in Israel's exports than in its imports. This
decline was due to a combination of factors. One was a more effective use of
the aforementioned price mechanism, which helped to direct exports—and to
a smaller extent, imports—from the payments agreements countries to the
open world market. Another factor was the move of the partner countries
toward freer trade and currency convertibility; some important examples were
the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. Turkey, the single most important
partner country throughout the years, did not switch to complete convertibility;
but this country, too, moved to rely considerably less on payments agree-
ments after its substantial devaluation of 1958. Thus, beginning in the late
1950s, trade under payments agreements, and therewith administrative inter-
ference in the geographic allocation of imports, ceased to be a factor of much
significance in Israel.
NOTES
1. In this section I draw substantially on Zvi Zussman, "The Foreign-Exchange
Budget as a Forecast of Imports of Goods to Israel" (MA. diss., Hebrew University,
1959; in Hebrew).
2. The budget year of the government of Israel runs from April to March.
3. Competent authorities for import licensing existed within the following minis-
tries: Finance, Commerce and Industry, Health, Post (Communications), Agriculture,
Labor, and Transportation. The division of authority among the ministries was deter-
mined according to the purpose of the imports. Thus, for instance, hospital equipment
was handled by the Ministry of Health, tractors by the Ministry of Agriculture, etc.
Sometimes, naturally, the dividing lines were not entirely clear-cut.
4. The principle of balancing the budget should not be taken too seriously. It should
be recalled that the Department of the Budget had wide discretion in determining
whether to include various categories of loans as receipts. Likewise, projected expendi-
tures could include additions to foreign-exchange reserves. Such inclusions or exclusions
could thus substantially alter the nature of a supposedly "balanced" budget.
5. The government did occasionally report the number of unsatisfied applications;
for instance, out of a total of 5,435 applications made from May 1949 to February
1950, 1,726 were approved and the rest were either rejected or "remained under con-56COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL AND PARTIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE 1950s
sideration." There is no estimate, however, of the size (indicated value of imports) of
each category of applications.
6. Partly to increase the proportion of licenses actually used, and to discourage ap-
plications intended as "safety margins," the government decided in later years to make
applications more costly. After April 1956, an application had to be accompanied by a
commitment to utilize the license within a specified time after it was granted, or pay
a fee amounting to 10 per cent of the value of the license. This procedure did not work
out very well and in March 1958 it was replaced by a requirement to deposit 10 to 20
per cent of the value of a license when it was granted. This requirement was also meant,
however, to make imports more expensive and to tighten credit.
7. In a rather involved scheme, and with aid of the Jewish Agency, the government
raised a special consolidation loan in the United States which was to be repaid from
future contributions of the Jewish communities in the United States. The money was
intended for the repayment of hard-pressing short-term foreign loans, and for the estab-
lishment of some minimum level of reserves. Since this loan was undertaken not directly
by the government, but by the Jewish communities, it appears in balance-of-payments
data as a unilateral transfer to Israel.
8. The study was conducted by Michael Rom (Rosenberg), and was summarized in
a memorandum entitled, "A Report of the Sub-Committee for the European Common
Market and Free-Trade Area on the Possibility of Israel Joining the E.E.C."(in
Hebrew). The report was circulated in a few typed copies at the end of 1957.
9. "Imports without payment" was the term commonly applied to this category of
transactions. Due to its popularity, itis used here too, although in effect, most of the
imports concerned were not "without payment." The official term for this category was,
indeed, more accurate and appropriate: "imports without allocation of foreign exchange."
10. If and when another source was illegally involved, such as repatriated foreign-
exchange holdings of local residents, it had to be disguised as originating from one of
these three legal sources.
11. In his budgetary speech of May 1950, the Minister of Finance estimated the
rate of extra profits in imports of supposed "gifts" at 60—70 per cent.
12. After April, it will be recalled, the rate was determined by the government. As
a result, very few transactions were conducted during the second half of the year in the
organized market, to which the data refer.
13. As noted above, these imports constituted at that time 70 per cent of total im-
ports via the IWP market.
14. Yoram Weiss, "Price Control in Israel, 1939—1963" (M.A. diss., Hebrew Univer-
sity, 1964; in Hebrew). Part of this study has been published in English: "Price Control
in Israel, 1949—58,"Bankof Israel EconomicReview37 (March 1971): 68—88.
15. Likewise, by all available accounts—which are obviously casual impressions
rather than precise estimates—the quantitative extent of the black market reached its
peak in that year.
It should be noted that the ratio of seven, mentioned in the text, is an average
around which there was substantial variation. The most extreme item was sugar, for
which the black-market price in 1951 was reported to be 25 times the official price.
16. On the strength of this association, it may be inferred that in 1959, a year in
which the list of controlled items was reduced to half its size in 1958, the excess of free
over controlled food prices must have become very small, perhaps insignificant. This
inference would be supported by all available casual impressions: by the late 1950s
black markets were rarely mentioned.NOTES 57
17.The ratio between the indices of free-market and official food prices was still
over S in August 1952, the date to which this part applies.
18. In principle, a black-market rate higher than the formal one could thus exist
even with a completely free movement of goods when controls are imposed on capital
movements alone. This, indeed, has roughly been the situation in Israel since the late
1950s; during all these years, the black-market rate has been only moderately above the
official rate, rarely exceeding the latter by more than 30 per cent.
19. Since the mid-1950s, transactions in the foreign-exchange black market are
thought to be only in the neighborhood of $5million—$1Omillion annually. The major
component of net demand in the market is generally believed to be demand by emigrants,
who have not been allowed foreign-exchange allocation for transferring their capital.
Another important source—up to the late 1950s—was demand by Israeli tourists, be-
cause foreign-exchange allowances• for travel were then nil.
20. This applies to the market in Tel Aviv. The rate in the Zurich market, confined
mainly to currency notes, was sometimes substantially different, although major move-
ments were similar in the two markets.
21. The substantial rise of the black-market rate in the last quarter of 1956most
probably reflects speculative demand due to the Sinai campaign in October of that
year. The rate went down again a short time later. During the rest of the 1950s and
1960s, excluding short-term episodes when the black-market rate obviously rose owing
to expectations of imminent devaluation, the excess of the black-market rate over
the formal rate normally fell within a range of 10 to 25 per cent.
22. That is, the price-level-deflated effective exchange rate. The index used for the
deflation abstracts from illegal markets.
23. For this calculation, defense materials are excluded from imports, since their
somewhat erratic behavior has had little to do with economic forces, and may be mis-
leading in the case of conclusions based on year-to-year comparisons.
24. This refers, of course, to prices of the finished product. Since imports of raw
materials were mostly free of duty, this gap of 50 per cent could have meant, in some
instances, very high protection rates. For industry as a whole the value added in the
economy during the mid-1950s was below 50 per cent. With the average level of duties
on raw materials being not more than a few percentage points, the 50 per cent gap
would have meant an average effective protection rate of at least 100 per cent.
25.Onaverage, this would have determined an effective protection rate quite similar
to the 100 per cent effective protection rate implied (on average) in the former rule,
in which a 50 per cent difference was allowed in the price of the final good.
26. For some evidence on this point, see Tsvi Goldberger (Ophir), "Protection
Policy in Israel" (M.A. diss., Hebrew University, 1957;inHebrew); and Alex Rubner,
TueEconomyof Israel (London: Cass, 1960).
27. As was mentioned earlier, even imports which were presumably liberalized re-
quired import licenses, by which the importer could be required to purchase the good
in a country other than the one of his choice.